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Abstract
In the endeavor of finding ways for easy data access for external researchers remote data access
seems to be an attractive alternative to the current standard of data perturbation or restricted
access only at designated data archives or research data centers. However, even if the microdata
are not available directly, disclosure of sensitive information is still possible. We illustrate that an
ill-intentioned user could use some commonly available background information to reveal sensitive
information using simple linear regression. We demonstrate the real risks from this approach with
an empirical evaluation based on a German establishment survey, the IAB Establishment Panel.
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1. Introduction
Data collecting agencies generally have two options if they are willing to provide access
to their data for external researchers. They can release data sets to the public if they can
guarantee that the dissemination will not harm the privacy of any survey respondent or
they can allow external researchers on-site access to the data in research data centers
(RDC) or data enclaves. Since most data have to be altered in some way to allow data
dissemination, many researchers prefer the direct access to the unaltered data at the
RDC, especially if the data dissemination requires perturbation of the microdata. For
this reason more and more agencies deposit their data at data enclaves or set up their own
research data centers. However, the use of these facilities comes at a high price both for
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the researcher and the providing agency. Researchers have to travel to the agency before
they ever get in touch with the original data. Although some agencies provide dummy
data sets to give the researcher an idea of the real data, these dummy data sets often
are of very low quality and the researcher might not realize that the data collected by
the agency is not suitable for her analysis before traveling to the agency. Furthermore,
researchers can request a certain time slot at the RDC in which they expect to finish their
research. It is very difficult for the researcher to anticipate how long the data preparation
will take without access to the data, and unexpected problems might require more days
than the admitted time slot will allow. Besides, if the researcher wants to extend her
research maybe using more variables than she asked for in the original proposal, she
might have to go through the complete reviewing process again before she can actually
add the variables to her analysis. On the other hand, the agency has to check every output
from the analysis for potential disclosure violations. Only cleared outputs may leave the
RDC and may be used by the researcher for publication. At present, this output checkin
is still carried out manually. With the growing popularity of the RDCs the capacity of
handling all this output checking is at the limit.
Given these drawbacks remote data access seems to be the panacea for data access
for external researchers. In an ideal world full remote access would enable the external
researcher to connect to a host server from her desktop machine. She would see the
microdata on the screen and would be allowed to manipulate them in any way but
the actual data would never leave the server and it would not be possible to store the
microdata on the desktop computer. Requested queries would be automatically scanned
for possible confidentiality violations and only those queries that pass the confidentiality
check would be answered by the server. Remote access would free the researcher from
the burden of traveling to the RDC and it would render the cost intensive and time
consuming manual output checking unnecessary. However, there are many obstacles
with this approach making the full implementation of a remote data access more than
questionable. Apart from the technical issues of guaranteeing a safe connection between
the desktop computer of the external user and the microdata server at the agency, direct
access to the unchanged microdata is prohibited by law in many countries. For example
in Germany, the data accessible for external researchers is required to be de facto
anonymised which means that the effort that is necessary to identify a single unit in
the data set is higher than the actual benefit the potential intruder would achieve by
this identification. This is still a privilege compared to the absolute anonymity that
is required for all published results. One solution in this context could be that the
researcher would only see an anonymised version of the microdata on her screen but the
queries she submits to the server would actually be run on the original data. However,
this would still require the server to identify all queries that might lead to a breach of
confidentiality.
Some of these queries are easy to identify. For example queries that ask for the
maximum or minimum of a variable should never be allowed. For tabulation queries
potentially identifying small cells could be suppressed using standard rules from the
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cell suppression literature.1 However, there are other analyses for which it is not that
obvious that they actually might impose an increased risk of disclosure and illustrating
this for a specific set of queries is the main aim of this paper.
We focus on the risks from simple linear regression analysis under the assumption
that the user will never see the true microdata. Given the legal restrictions in many
countries (see discussion above), we believe that even under remote access the user will
only see an anonymised version of the true microdata. In this sense our notion of remote
access is located somewhere in the middle between the dream of a full remote access
and the idea of a remote analysis server that can only answer specified queries without
providing access to any microdata at all. We note that our findings are also relevant in
the context of a plain remote analysis server.
Often regression analysis is considered as safe in the sense that it is assumed that
no output checking is required. Following the discussion in Gomatam et al. (2005) we
illustrate that an intruder with background knowledge on some of the variables contained
in the data set can get accurate estimates for any sensitive variable she is interested in
using only the results from a linear regression analysis. We use the IAB Establishment
Panel to demonstrate empirically that at least for business data very limited and easily
available background information can be sufficient to allow the intruder to obtain
sensitive information with this approach.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recapitulates the basic
concept that allows the intruder to retrieve sensitive information for a single respondent
based on the background information she has about that respondent. In this section we
follow the outline described in Gomatam et al. (2005). In Section 3 we briefly introduce
the data set we used for the empirical simulations: the IAB Establishment Panel. This
data set is used in Section 4 to illustrate that only very limited background information
is required to learn sensitive information about a survey respondent in this setting. The
paper concludes with some final remarks.
2. The formal approach
In the following we assume that the intruder has at least approximate knowledge about
some of the variables contained in the survey for a certain survey respondent m. It is
important to note that this knowledge may refer to any set of variables in the data
set, no matter if the variables are sensitive or not. For example in a business survey,
the external information available to the intruder might be the energy consumption or
the total production time. The intruder would then use these variables for obtaining
information on sensitive variables such as investment, sales, or research expenditures.
1. Even cell suppression can quickly become problematic, if we allow dynamic queries. In this case, the server
would have to keep track of all earlier queries and would have to guarantee that requests submitted at a later point
in time would not allow the calculation of cell entries that are being suppressed now.
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In the following we denote the variable for which information is at hand by x and the
true value for this variable provided by the survey respondent m by x0m. Let xˆm be
the external information the intruder obtained about the survey respondent m for this
variable. Finally, let ym be the reported value for respondent m for the sensitive variable
of interest y.
Gomatam et al. (2005) pointed out that the knowledge of xˆm may be used to obtain
information for any other variable contained in the microdata set for this respondent
by making the variable of interest the dependent variable in a simple linear regression
analysis. The authors propose two approaches: (i) The intruder could generate an
“artificial outlier” obtained by transformation. (ii) Alternatively, the intruder could
employ a “strategic dummy variable” which uses the background information for
identifying the respondent m.
2.1. Artificial outliers
For the artificial outlier approach we assume the intruder knows the exact reported value
for xm, that is xˆm = x0m. She defines a new regressor variable
z =
1
|x− xˆm|+ ǫ
(1)
where ǫ is arbitrarily small. If we include this regressor variable in a linear regression
with the variable of interest specified as the dependent variable, the regressor z will
become extremely large for the respondent m and therefore generates a leverage point
such that the predicted value of the dependent variable tends towards the true value y0m
for this respondent. A formal proof that
lim
zm→∞
yˆm = ym
holds, is given in Appendix A1. It is important to note that this is true only if no other
respondent reports a value for x that is equal to x0m. If other respondents report the same
value, ym will generally not be predicted exactly (see Appendix A1 for details).
2.2. Strategic dummies
Alternatively, the intruder could define a dummy that exploits the knowledge regarding
the variable x. In case of exact knowledge of the reported value the dummy would be
given by
ℑx=xm =
{
1 if x = xˆm
0 else. (2)
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In other situations only vague information might be available represented by an interval
in which the true value x0m must fall. This range might be formulated in additive or
multiplicative terms, that is
x0m−γ< xˆm < x
0
m +γ or (1−δ)x0m < xˆm < (1+δ)x0m.
Thus, assuming only approximate knowledge one would create a strategic dummy
according to
ℑx≃xm =
{
1 if x−γ< xˆm < x+γ
0 else (3)
or the corresponding multiplicative specification mentioned above.
It is shown in Appendix A.2 that a simple regression which uses just this dummy
variable and any variable of interest as the dependent variable will result in
yˆm = y0m.
The result remains valid if other regressors are added to the model (see Appendix A.2).
However, the proof again is based on the assumption that only a single respondent
is identified using the knowledge regarding x. If x is a categorical variable, this is an
unrealistic assumption and even for continuous variables more than one respondent
may report the same value. Still, with the dummy variable approach the constructed
dummy can easily be based on more than one variable exploiting all the information
the intruder has about the survey respondent. In our business survey example this could
mean that the intruder uses her information about the industry, an approximate number
of employees, and regional information about the establishment she is looking for. In
this case we could define an indicator dummy for each variable for which the intruder
has background information.
Let x1, . . . ,xp be the variables for which background information is available and let
ℑ1, ...ℑp be the corresponding indicators defined as in (2) or (3). Now the final indicator
can be defined as follows:
ℑ =
{
1 if ℑ1 = 1∧ℑ2 = 1∧ ·· ·∧ℑp = 1
0 else. (4)
It is important to note that both the artificial and the strategic dummy approach critically
rely on the assumption that a single record can be identified with the external information
the intruder has about m. However, the artificial outlier approach requires that the
intruder knows x0m exactly. This is often unrealistic in reality. With the dummy variable
approach it can be sufficient to have a rough estimate of x0m.
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3. The IAB Establishment Panel
Since our empirical evaluations in the next section are based on the wave 2007 of
the IAB Establishment Panel a short introduction of the data set should prelude our
illustrations. The IAB Establishment Panel is based on the German employment register
aggregated via the establishment number as of 30 June of each year. The basis of
the register, the German Social Security Data (GSSD) is the integrated notification
procedure for the health, pension and unemployment insurances, which was introduced
in January 1973. This procedure requires employers to notify the social security agencies
about all employees covered by social security. As by definition the German Social
Security Data only include employees covered by social security – civil servants and
unpaid family workers for example are not included – approx. 80% of the German
workforce are represented. However, the degree of coverage varies considerably across
the occupations and the industries.
Since the register only contains information on employees covered by social security,
the panel includes establishments with at least one employee covered by social security.
The sample is drawn using a stratified sampling design. The stratification cells are
defined by ten classes for the size of the establishment, 16 classes for the region, and 17
classes for the industry.
These cells are also used for weighting and extrapolation of the sample. The survey
is conducted by interviewers from TNS Infratest Sozialforschung. For the first wave,
4,265 establishments were interviewed in West Germany in the third quarter of 1993.
Since then the Establishment Panel has been conducted annually – since 1996 with over
4,700 establishments in East Germany in addition. In the wave 2007 more than 15,000
establishments participated in the survey. Each year, the panel is accompanied by sup-
plementary samples and follow-up samples to include new or reviving establishments
and to compensate for panel mortality. The list of questions contains detailed infor-
mation about the firms’ personnel structure, development and personnel policy. For a
detailed description of the data set we refer to Fischer et al. (2008) or Ko¨lling (2000).
For the simulations we use one data set with all missing values imputed. We treat all
imputed values like originally observed values for simplicity. See Drechsler (2010) for
a description of the multiple imputation of the missing values in the survey.
4. Empirical evidence
For our empirical evaluations, we use the wave 2007 of the establishment survey and
treat the turnover of an establishment as the sensitive variable to be disclosed. Thus, we
exclude all entities from the survey that do not report turnover such as non-industrial
organizations, regional and local authorities and administrations, financial institutions,
and insurance companies. The remaining data set includes 12,814 completely observed
establishments. We analyze different subsets of the dataset defined by quantiles of the
establishment size to illustrate the increased risk for larger establishments.
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Table 1: Disclosure risk evaluations using an artificial outlier generated from establishment size.
quantile N prop. uniqu. ∆ all ∆ uniqu.
identified identified identified
size
all 12814 0.034 13773.795 0.001
0.5 6516 0.066 26936.156 0.001
0.75 3217 0.134 51952.053 0.001
0.9 1282 0.335 1.957 0.001
0.99 129 0.969 0.011 0.0001
4.1. Empirical evidence for artificial outliers
Using the number of employees as the available background information we construct a
variable z according to (1) setting ε = 0.0001. To evaluate the risks for the complete
data set we successively treat each record in the data set as the target m for which
background information is available. Table 1 summarizes the results of the artificial
outlier regressions for different subsets of the data. The first column defines the subset
of the data. For example, the results for the 90% quantile represent only the largest 10%
of establishments. The second column provides the number of records that are contained
in the subset. Column 3 contains the percentage of records that are uniquely identified
based on an artificial outlier derived from the establishment size, i. e. it contains the
percentage of unique high leverage points regarding the number of employees. If there
is more than one high leverage point, additional establishments reduce the prediction
accuracy for the target’s turnover (see the proof in Appendix A.1). Column 4 presents
the average absolute relative error between the predicted and the observed value for
turnover for the target record m, i.e.
∆ = 1
N
N
∑
j=1
|yˆm= j − ym= j|
ym= j
(5)
for all records in the subset. Finally, column 5 presents the same quantity only for the
records that are uniquely identified and therefore generate a unique high leverage point
for z.
As expected the disclosure risk clearly increases with establishment size. Under
the assumption that the intruder would know the exact reported establishment size,
we observe a substantial increase in the risk when going from the largest 10% of the
establishments (33.5% correctly identified) to the largest 1% of establishments (96.9%
correctly identified). Below these thresholds identification risks are relatively low since
establishment size alone will not uniquely identify a single record. The results in column
4 illustrate that generally risks are low as long as a unique identification is not possible.
The average absolute relative error is very large (often far more than 100%) indicating
that the predicted value on average differs substantially from the reported value. Finally,
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all the values close to zero in the last column are by no means surprising. This is a direct
result of the proof given in Appendix A.1. We only include these results to emphasize
that once a record is uniquely identified, the intruder does not have to have direct access
to the microdata. Instead she can use the artificial outlier approach (or the dummy
variable approach discussed below) to exactly reveal any sensitive information about
the identified record.
Often the intruder will have more background information on the target than just
one variable. Generally she can use this information to generate more artificial outliers
and also include them in the regression. For brevity we omit the proof that an exact
prediction is possible with more than one outlier variable. A detailed proof can be found
in Ronning et al. (2010).
However, simply using two outlier variables in the regression will not necessarily
increase the number of uniquely identified records. The proof only holds if both
outliers individually identify the same single record uniquely. This means that in general
there is no benefit from adding a second artificial outlier to the regression since the
dependent variable will only be predicted correctly for those units for which one of
the background variables alone already uniquely identifies the target. The same results
would be achievable if the intruder would run two separate regressions using one
outlier at a time. To fully utilize the additional background knowledge the intruder
should interact the background variables and apply the artificial outlier approach to the
interaction term. If the joint background information identifies a record uniquely, the
value of the interaction term will also be a unique value in the data set.
We illustrate the increased risks if the intruder has information on more than one
variable in Table 2. We assume the intruder knows the exact number of employees and
the German Federal State in which the establishment is located and uses the interaction
of the two variables to generate the artificial outlier.
As expected the disclosure risks increase considerably. For example 15.9% (87.2%)
of the establishments in the complete data set (of the largest 10% of the establishments)
are identified uniquely compared to only 3.4% (33.5%) if the establishment size is used
alone to identify the target. In theory the intruder could further improve her results if
more background information is available. The more variables are interacted to generate
the artificial outlier the higher is the chance of a unique identification and thus a perfect
Table 2: Disclosure risk evaluations using artificial outliers generated from the interaction term of
establishment size and German Federal State.
quantile N prop. uniqu. ∆ all ∆ uniqu.
identified records identified
size*fed.
state
all 12814 0.159 17820.512 0.035
0.5 6516 0.312 33908.516 0.036
0.75 3217 0.596 63907.225 0.006
0.9 1282 0.872 0.338 0.0003
0.99 129 1 1.86∗10−5 1.86∗10−5
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prediction. However, a regression using three-way, four-way or even higher interaction
terms will look very suspicious or might not be allowed in a remote access setting.
4.2. Empirical evidence for strategic dummies
For the strategic dummy approach we evaluate for each record if a unique identification
is possible using a varying amount of background information. For the background in-
formation we chose four variables that we believe are easy to obtain for an intruder from
public records, namely the (approximate) size of the establishment, i.e. its (approximate)
total number of employees, the German Federal State the establishment is located in, its
legal form and its industrial sector (recorded in 40 categories). We evaluate the increase
in risk if these variables are added successively to the strategic dummy. The results are
summarized in the Table 3. Not surprisingly the same percentage of records as in Ta-
Table 3: Disclosure risk evaluations using the strategic dummy approach.
quantile N indicators prop. uniqu. ∆ all ∆ uniqu.
ℑk identified records identified
all 12814
exact size 0.034 13801.825 0
approx. size 0.0009 11025.450 0
+ federal state 0.023 11739.574 0
+ legal form 0.116 13633.345 0
+ branch 0.658 1.478 0
0.5 6516
exact size 0.066 26985.871 0
approx. size 0.002 21526.008 0
+ federal state 0.046 21945.190 0
+ legal form 0.200 26774.728 0
+ branch 0.846 0.323 0
0.75 3217
exact size 0.134 52023.417 0
approx. size 0.003 40965.983 0
+ federal state 0.085 39651.427 0
+ legal form 0.228 48390.483 0
+ branch 0.868 0.147 0
0.9 1282
exact size 0.335 1.956 0
approx. size 0.009 4.296 0
+ federal state 0.186 1.944 0
+ legal form 0.352 1.499 0
+ branch 0.895 0.070 0
0.99 129
exact size 0.969 0.011 0
approx. size 0.085 1.311 0
+ federal state 0.682 0.136 0
+ legal form 0.806 0.055 0
+ branch 0.953 0.021 0
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ble 1 are identified, if the exact establishment size is used as a dummy. Relaxing the
unrealistic assumption of exactly knowing the size of the establishment we use an
indicator for the approximate total number of employees that identifies all records that
lie within ±2.5% of the reported establishment size. This information alone almost
never uniquely identifies a record in the data set. Even for the top 0.1% of establishments
only 31% are uniquely identified. However, adding more information significantly
increases the risk. When all four background variables are used, more than 65% of
the establishments are identified uniquely in the entire data set. Since arguably intruders
will only be interested in the larger establishments and not in small family businesses,
the fact that almost 90% of the records can be uniquely identified for the largest 10%
of the establishments based on very little background information is an alarming result.
Again, we only include the results in the last column of the table to emphasize that
once a record is uniquely identified all information in the data set for that record can be
revealed easily without access to the actual microdata.
This leads to the question how the intruder will know that she has indeed uniquely
identified the mth respondent. Of course, the natural way would be to check the
residuals of the regression for zeroes. However, residuals usually are not reported in
remote access. Alternatively, for the dummy variable approach the intruder could check
the mean of the generated dummy variable which should be 1/n in case of unique
identification. If the agency decides to suppress means for binary variables with few
positive (or negative) outcomes, the intruder could compute the variance of the dummy
variable. Given a unique identification it should be equal to Var(ℑ) = 1/n+1/n2. Both
approaches are of course not possible when generating an artificial outlier since z would
just be a new continuous variable with unknown mean and variance. In this case, the
intruder might check, if a unique maximum exists for z. Only if the maximum is unique,
a single record has been identified. However, such requests will likely be suppressed by
the remote server. This can be seen as an additional argument in favor of the strategic
dummy approach.
5. Conclusion
It is obvious that agencies – once they are aware of the risks described in the previous
sections – can easily prevent this type of disclosure, e.g. by prohibiting regressions that
contain dichotomous regressors with less than say 3 positive outcomes or by allowing
only certain transformations for the variables. But it is important that the agency must
be aware of the problem to prevent it. The point that we are trying to make is that
there are many constellations that might lead to a risk of disclosure. Some are obvious
whereas others are more difficult to detect in advance. Full remote access without any
intervention of the agency would require that all possible constellations are considered
and ruled out before data access is provided. The risk from linear regressions that is
the main topic of this paper is only one example of a disclosure risk that might not
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be obvious at first glance. We believe there are many other situations that might be
equally harmful. For example it is well known that saturated models can reveal the
exact information for small cell table entries that would have been protected by cell
suppression or any other statistical disclosure limitation technique if the table would
have been requested directly. We believe that more research in the area is needed to
detect other user queries that might impose a risk of disclosure. Whether it will be
possible to rule out all potential disclosure risks in advance remains an open question.
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A. Artificial outliers and strategic dummies
We consider the linear model
y = X β + u, (6)
where y and u are n-dimensional vectors, β is a K-dimensional vector and X a (n×K)
matrix with ι ′ = (1,1, . . . ,1) as the first column. The vector of predicted values is given
by
yˆ = X (X′X)−1 X′ y = Hy (7)
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where H, called the hat matrix, measures the “leverage” of a certain regressor (see, e.g.
Hoaglin and Welsh (1978)).
A.1 Artificial outliers
In the following we assume that the observations are ordered such that observations
for survey respondent m are in the first row of the data matrix. Therefore z1 contains
the artificial outlier which tends towards infinity; compare the definition (1) of artificial
outliers in the main text.
Unique identification
In the special case of a simple regression (K = 2) with
X =
(
ι z
)
the elements of the hat matrix are given by
h jk =
1
n∑z2i − (∑zi)2
(
n
∑
i=1
z2i − z j
n
∑
i=1
zi− zk
n
∑
i=1
zi +nz jzk
)
,
with j = 1, . . . ,n and k = 1, . . . ,n. Therefore the jth element of the vector of predicted
values yˆ is given by
yˆ j =
n
∑
k=1
h jkyk =
1
n∑z2i − (∑zi)2
n
∑
k=1
(
n
∑
i=1
z2i − z j
n
∑
i=1
zi− zk
n
∑
i=1
zi +nz jzk
)
yk
and in particular for j = 1 we have
yˆ1 =
1
n∑z2i − (∑zi)2
n
∑
k=1
[
n
∑
i=1
z2i − z1
n
∑
i=1
zi− zk
n
∑
i=1
zi +nz1zk
]
yk
=
1
n∑z2i − (∑zi)2
[(
n
∑
i=1
z2i − z1
n
∑
i=1
zi
)
n
∑
k=1
yk −
(
n
∑
i=1
zi−nz1
)
n
∑
k=1
zkyk
]
=
(
∑ni=1 z2i − z1 ∑ni=1 zi
)
∑nk=1 yk
n∑z2i − (∑zi)2
−
(∑ni=1 zi−nz1)∑nk=1 zkyk
n∑z2i − (∑zi)2
=
(
z21 +∑i>1 z2i − z1(z1 +∑i>1 zi)
)
∑nk=1 yk
n(z21 +∑i>1 z2i )− (z1 +∑i>1 zi)2
−
(z1 +∑i>1 zi−nz1)(z1y1 +∑k>1 zkyk)
n(z21 +∑i>1 z2i )− (z1 +∑i>1 zi)2
= A − B.
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In order to obtain results for z1 → ∞ we write the two terms as follows:
A =
[(
1+ ∑i>1 z
2
i
z21
)
−
(
1+ ∑i>1 ziz1
)]
∑nk=1 yk
n
(
1+ ∑i>1 z
2
i
z21
)
−
(
1+ ∑i>1 ziz1
)2
and
B =
(
1+ ∑i>1 ziz1 −n
)(
y1 + ∑k>1 zkykz1
)
n
(
1+ ∑i>1 z
2
i
z21
)
−
(
1+ ∑i>1 ziz1
)2
from which we obtain
lim
z1→∞
yˆ1 = lim
z1→∞
(A−B) =
0
n−1
−
(1−n)y1
n−1
= y1. (8)
Therefore for a sufficiently large z1 we can approximate y1 by its predicted value yˆ1.
Non-unique identification
To this point we assumed that the target is uniquely identified by the background
information resp. the transformed outlier generating variable (see (1) in the main text).
Now consider the case where more than a single subject is identified by xm resp. z. In
this case the matrix containing the outlier is given by
X2 =
(
z1 ιq
z2
)
.
We assume q subjects are identified, i.e. have the exact same value for the background
variable as the target record. These q subjects are transformed to artificial outliers.
Without loss of generality let them be the first q observations in the dataset. ιq is a
q-vector of ones and 0 a (n−q)-vector of zeros so that
X2 (X′2X2)−1X′2 =
1
qz21 +∑i>q z2i
(
z21ιqι
′
q z1 ιq z
′
2
z1 z2 ι
′
q z2z
′
2
)
and
X2 (X′2X2)−1X′2
(
y−X1 ˆβ 1
)
=
1
qz21 +∑i>q z2i
(
z21ιqι
′
q z1 ιq z
′
2
z1 z2 ι
′
q z2z
′
2
) (
y−X1 ˆβ 1
)
.
The predicted values are given by
yˆ = X1 ˆβ 1 +
1
qz21 +∑i>q z2i
(
z21ιqι
′
q z1 ιq z
′
2
z1 z2 ι
′
q z2z
′
2
) (
y−X1 ˆβ 1
)
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respectively
(
yˆq
yˆn−q
)
=
=
(
X1q
X1,n−q
)
ˆβ 1 +
1
qz21 +∑i>q z2i
(
z21ιqι
′
q z1 ιq z
′
2
z1 z2 ι
′
q z2z
′
2
){(
yq
yn−q
)
−
(
X1q
X1,n−q
)
ˆβ 1
}
For the first q elements of the vector yˆ of predicted values we get
yˆq = X1q ˆβ 1 +
1
qz21 +∑i>q z2i
(
z21ιqι
′
q z1 ιq z
′
2
) {( yq
yn−q
)
−
(
X1q
X1,n−q
)
ˆβ 1
}
= X1q ˆβ 1
+
1
qz21 +∑i>q z2i
z21 ιqι
′
q (yq−X1q ˆβ 1)
+
1
qz21 +∑i>q z2i
z1 ιq z
′
2 (yn−q−X1,n−q ˆβ 1)
= X1q ˆβ 1
+
1
q + ∑i>q z
2
i
z21
ιqι
′
q (yq−X1q ˆβ 1)
+
1
q + ∑i>q z
2
i
z21
1
z1
ιq z
′
2 (yn−q−X1,n−q ˆβ 1) (9)
If z1 becomes infinitely large the limit of the predicted values is
lim
z1→∞
yˆq =
1
q
ιqι
′
q yq +X1q ˆβ 1 −
1
q
ιqι
′
q X1q ˆβ 1 (10)
resulting in
yˆi = yq +
(
1, xi2− x(2)q , . . . , xiK − x(K)q
)
ˆβ 1 , i = 1,2, . . . ,q. (11)
Here we use
yq =
1
q
q
∑
i=1
yi and x(k)q =
1
q
q
∑
i=1
xik , k = 2, . . . ,K .
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Both (10) and (11) show that
• if q = 1, i.e. unique identification, the result reduces to (8) because yq = y1 and
x
(k)
q = x1k for all regressors.
• If only the artificial outlier generating z is used in a simple linear regression it
holds that
lim
z1→∞
yˆi = yq , i = 1, . . . ,q,
for all q subjects selected.
• In general however, under non-unique identification no clear-cut statement regard-
ing the difference between yˆi and yi , i = 1,2, . . . ,q, can be made.
A.2 Strategic dummy variables
Simple regression
In case of unique identification by (2), (3) or (4) in the main text the regressor matrix is
given by
X =
(
ι e1
)
,
where e1 is an n-dimensional vector with 1 as the first element and 0 for the remaining
n−1 elements. Therefore
(X′X)−1 =
1
(n−1)
(
1 −1
−1 n
)
and
H =
1
n−1
(
n−1 0′
0 ιn−1ι ′n−1
)
,
where 0 is the (n−1)-dimensional null vector and ιn−1 a (n−1)-dimensional vector of
ones. Note that h11 = 1 and h1 j = 0, j > 1, so that the predicted value for y1 is given by
yˆ1 =
n
∑
k=1
h1kyk =
1
n−1
(
(n−1)y1 + ∑
k>1
0 · yk
)
= y1.
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The case of additional regressors
We now consider the case that other regressors are added to the regression which might
be motivated by the idea that the use of a strategic dummy is not so easily detected by
the agency if other regressors are also included in the model. We write the model in
partitioned form as
y = Xβ +u =
(
X1 X2
)( β 1
β 2
)
+u = X1β 1 +X2β 2 +u.
with
X2 = e1
so that this submatrix contains only the information regarding the strategic dummy. Then
the vector of predicted values can be written as
yˆ = X1 ˆβ 1 + X2 ˆβ 2
= X1 ˆβ 1 + X2 (X′2X2)−1X′2
(
y−X1 ˆβ 1
)
(12)
Since
X2 (X′2X2)−1X′2 =
(
1 0
0 0
)
and
X2 (X′2X2)−1X′2
(
y−X1 ˆβ 1
)
=
(
1 0
0 0
) (
y−X1 ˆβ 1
)
=


y1
0
.
.
.
0

 −


1 x12 . . . x1K
0 0 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 0

 ˆβ 1,
we obtain for the vector of predicted values in (12):
yˆ = X1 ˆβ 1 +


y1
0
.
.
.
0

 −


1 x12 . . . x1K
0 0 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 0

 ˆβ 1 (13)
P. Bleninger, J. Drechsler and G. Ronning 23
and in particular for the first element we get
yˆ1 =
(
1 x12 . . . x1K
)
ˆβ 1 + y1 −
(
1 x12 . . . x1K
)
ˆβ 1 = y1. (14)
Non-unique identification
The empirical example in Section 4 shows that ym and yˆm may differ substantially if
more than one respondent is identified using the background information available for
xm. In this section we evaluate the fitted value yˆm in this case.
If more than one respondent is picked by the strategic dummy the submatrix X2
(which actually is a vector) has the form
X2 =
(
ιq
0
)
where we assume that q units in the data set have the same reported value for the
available background information as the target record xm and that they are placed in the
first q rows of the data matrix. ιq is a vector of ones and 0 denotes a n−q dimensional
vector of zeroes. Moreover, we have
X2 (X′2X2)−1X′2 =
1
q
(
ιqι
′
q 0
0 0
)
and
X2 (X′2X2)−1X′2
(
y−X1 ˆβ 1
)
=
1
q
(
ιqι
′
q 0
0 0
) (
y−X1 ˆβ 1
)
=


yq
yq
.
.
.
yq
0
.
.
.
0


−


1 x(2)q . . . x(K)q
1 x(2)q . . . x(K)q
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 x(2)q . . . x(K)q
0 0 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 0


ˆβ 1,
where we use
yq =
1
q
q
∑
i=1
yi and x(k)q =
1
q
q
∑
i=1
xik , k = 2, . . . ,K.
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Comparing this with (9) we note that for the first q elements of the vector yˆ we obtain
yˆi = yq +
(
1, xi2− x(2)q , . . . , xiK − x(K)q
)
ˆβ 1 , i = 1,2, . . . ,q. (15)
which implies the following: (i) If q = 1 and therefore a single unit is identified, the
above result is equivalent with (14) because then yq = y1 and for all regressors x(k)q = x1k.
(ii) If the strategic dummy is used as a single regressor then for all q units
yˆi = yq
holds, that is, the estimated value of y equals the arithmetic mean of all q units. (iii) If
more regressors are added to the model, no clear-cut statement regarding the difference
between ym and yˆm can be made.
